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ABSTRACT
Today’s data networks are surprisingly fragile and difficult to man-
age. We argue that the root of these problems lies in the complexity
of the control and management planes—the software and protocols
coordinating network elements—and particularly the way the de-
cision logic and the distributed-systems issues are inexorably in-
tertwined. We advocate a complete refactoring of the function-
ality and propose three key principles—network-level objectives,
network-wide views, and direct control—that we believe should
underlie a new architecture. Following these principles, we identify
an extreme design point that we call “4D,” after the architecture’s
four planes: decision, dissemination, discovery, and data. The 4D
architecture completely separates an AS’s decision logic from pro-
tocols that govern the interaction among network elements. The
AS-level objectives are specified in the decision plane, and en-
forced through direct configuration of the state that drives how the
data plane forwards packets. In the 4D architecture, the routers and
switches simply forward packets at the behest of the decision plane,
and collect measurement data to aid the decision plane in control-
ling the network. Although 4D would involve substantial changes
to today’s control and management planes, the format of data pack-
ets does not need to change; this eases the deployment path for the
4D architecture, while still enabling substantial innovation in net-
work control and management. We hope that exploring an extreme
design point will help focus the attention of the research and in-
dustrial communities on this crucially important and intellectually
challenging area.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: Packet Switching Net-
works; C.2.2 [Network Protocols]: Routing Protocols; C.2.3 [Network
Operations]: Network Management
General Terms
Measurement, Control, Performance, Reliability
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although IP networking has been wildly successful, there are
serious problems lurking “under the hood.” IP networks exhibit a
defining characteristic of unstable complex systems—a small local
event (e.g., misconfiguration of a routing protocol on a single in-
terface) can have severe, global impact in the form of a cascading
meltdown. In addition, individual Autonomous Systems (ASes)
must devote significant resources to “working around” the con-
straints imposed by today’s protocols and mechanisms to achieve
their goals for traffic engineering, survivability, security, and pol-
icy enforcement. We believe the root cause of these problems lies
in the control plane running on the network elements and the man-
agement plane that monitors and configures them. In this paper, we
argue for revisiting the division of functionality and advocate an ex-
treme design point that completely separates a network’s decision
logic from the the protocols that govern interaction of network el-
ements We initially focus our attention on the operation of a single
Autonomous System (AS), though we also discuss how multiple
ASes can coordinate their actions.
The Internet architecture bundles control logic and packet han-
dling into the individual routers and switches distributed through-
out an AS. As a result, each router/switch1 participates in distrib-
uted protocols that implicitly embed the decision logic. For ex-
ample, in IP networks, the path-computation logic is governed by
distributed protocols such as OSPF, IS-IS, and EIGRP. The routing
protocols dictate not only how the routers learn about the topol-
ogy, but also how they select paths. Similarly, in Ethernet net-
works, the path-computation logic is embedded in the Spanning
Tree protocol [1]. However, today’s data networks, operated by
numerous institutions and deployed in diverse environments, must
support network-level objectives and capabilities far more sophisti-
cated than best-effort packet delivery. These ever-evolving require-
ments have led to incremental changes in the control-plane pro-
tocols, as well as complex management-plane software that tries
to “coax” the control plane into satisfying the network objectives.
The resulting complexity is responsible for the increasing fragility
of IP networks and the tremendous difficulties facing people trying
to understand and manage their networks.
Continuing on the path of incremental evolution would lead to
additional point solutions that exacerbate the underlying problem
of an overly-complex control plane. Instead, we advocate redesign-
ing the control and management functions from the ground up.
We believe that a clean-slate approach based on sound principles
will, at the minimum, provide an alternative perspective and shed
light on fundamental trade-offs in the design of network control
and management functions. More strongly, we believe that such an
1We use the terms “network element” and “router/switch” inter-
changeably throughout the paper.
approach is necessary to avoid perpetuating the substantial com-
plexity of today’s control plane. Fortunately, we can make signif-
icant, fundamental changes in the control and management of IP
networks without changing the format of the data packets. This
enables network evolution and provides a key lever for substantial
innovation in the Internet architecture. A good example of this prin-
ciple is the Ethernet technology, which has successfully evolved
from a shared-medium network to a switched network with new
control-plane protocols based on learning and spanning trees, all
while leaving the packet format unchanged.
This paper presents an initial effort for a clean slate design ap-
proach to data-network control and management. To guide our de-
sign, we start from a small set of principles: network-level objec-
tives, network-wide views, and direct control. These principles lead
us to the 4D architecture that refactors functionality into four com-
ponents: the data, discovery, dissemination, and decision planes.
The decision plane for an AS creates a network configuration that
satisfies AS-level objectives. The decision plane has a network-
wide view of the topology and traffic, and exerts direct control
over the operation of the data plane. No decision logic is hard-
wired in protocols distributed among the network elements. The
output of the decision logic is communicated to routers/switches
by the dissemination plane. Our study investigates an extreme de-
sign point where the decision logic is completely separated from
distributed protocols. By pulling all of the decision logic out of the
network elements, we enable both simpler protocols and more so-
phisticated algorithms for driving the operation of the data plane.
In addition, we believe that the technology trends toward ever-more
powerful, reliable, and inexpensive computing platforms make our
design point attractive in practice.
Our goal for this paper is not to prove that 4D is the best ap-
proach. In fact, our research is still at an early stage and there
are many unanswered questions about the architecture. Rather, by
presenting a specific design alternative that is radically different
from today’s approach, and more reminiscent of early alternatives
to IP such as SNA, we want to highlight the issues that need to be
considered in a clean slate design of network control and manage-
ment. We hope this work will help focus the attention of the In-
ternet research community and industry on this crucially important
and intellectually challenging area. In the next section, we present
examples of the problems that face network designers today, and
explain why conventional techniques are inadequate. We then step
back and identify three principles that we argue should underlie
the architecture for controlling and managing data networks. Next,
we outline our results from a clean-slate redesign of the control
and management architecture based on these principles. We set out
the potential benefits and drawbacks of the architecture, and we
articulate a research agenda with the challenges that must be met
to realize the architecture. Finally, we explain how the architec-
ture differs from previous approaches and present examples of how
such research might be conducted.
2. CONTROL & MANAGEMENT TODAY
In today’s data networks, the functionality that controls the net-
work is split into three main planes: (i) the data plane that handles
the individual data packets; (ii) the control plane that implements
the distributed routing algorithms across the network elements; and
(iii) the management plane that monitors the network and config-
ures the data-plane mechanisms and control-plane protocols.
While the original IP control plane was designed to have a sin-
gle distributed algorithm to maintain the forwarding table in the
data plane, today’s IP data, control and management planes are far
more complex. The data plane needs to implement, in addition to
next-hop forwarding, functions such as tunneling, access control,
address translation, and queuing. The states used to implement
these functions are governed by multiple entities and have to be
configured through a rich set of individual, interacting commands.
Even for the forwarding state, there are usually multiple routing
processes running on the same router/switch.
While there are many dependencies among the states and the
logic updating the states, most of the dependencies are not main-
tained automatically. For example, controlling routing and reach-
ability today requires complex arrangements of commands to tag
routes, filter routes, and configure multiple interacting routing pro-
cesses, all the while ensuring that no router is asked to handle more
routes and packet filters than it has resources to cope with. A
change to any one part of the configuration can easily break other
parts.
The problem is exacerbated as packet delivery cannot commence
until the routing protocols create the necessary forwarding tables,
and the management plane cannot reach the control plane until the
routing protocols are configured. Resolving this catch-22 requires
installing a significant amount of configuration information on IP
routers before deployment.2 Studies of production networks show
them requiring hundreds of thousands of lines of low-level con-
figuration commands distributed across all the routers in the net-
work [2]. These configurations and the dynamic forwarding state
they generate require a myriad of ad hoc scripts and systems in the
management plane to validate, monitor, and update. The result is a
complex and failure-prone network.
We present two examples that illustrate the network fragility
caused by today’s complex and unwieldy control and management
infrastructure. The examples illustrate how the lack of coordination
between routing and security mechanisms can result in a fragile
network, and how today’s control and management infrastructure
makes it difficult to properly coordinate the mechanisms.
2.1 Reachability Control in Enterprises
Today, many enterprise networks attempt to control which hosts
and services on their network can communicate (i.e., reach each
other) as part of their security strategy [2]. They implement their
strategies using a combination of routing policy and packet filters,
but this approach is fraught with peril even in simple networks.
Consider the example enterprise network in Figure 1. The com-
pany has two locations, A and B. Each location has a number of
“front office” computers used by the sales agents (AF1-2 and BF1-
2). Each location also has a data center where servers are kept
(AD1-2 and BD1-2). Initially, the two locations are connected by a
link between the front office routers, R2 and R4, over which inter-
office communications flow. The Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP)
metric for each link is shown in italics. The company’s security
policy is for front-office computers to be able to communicate with
other locations’ front office computers and the local data center’s
servers, but not the data center of the other location. Such policies
are common in industries like insurance, where the sales agents
of each location are effectively competing against each other even
though they work for the same company. The security policy is im-
plemented using packet filters on the routers controlling entrance
2This problem is so profound that, whenever possible, remote rout-
ers/switches are plugged into telephone modems so that the Public
Switched Telephone Network provides a management communi-
cation path of last resort. Before making configuration changes to
the router over the Internet via Telnet or ssh, operators often dou-
ble check that the modem connection is still functioning, lest an
unfortunate configuration mistake leave them with no other way to





























Figure 1: Enterprise network with two locations, each location
with a front office and a data-center.
to the data centers to drop packets that violate the policy. Interface
i1.1 is configured with a packet filter that drops all packets from the
BF subnet, and interface i3.1 drops all packets from the AF subnet.
The network functions as desired, until the day when the data-
center staff decides to add a new, high-capacity dedicated link be-
tween the data centers (shown as a dashed line between R1 and
R3—perhaps they have decided to use each other as remote backup
locations). It seems reasonable that with packet filters protecting
the entrances to the data centers, the new link between data cen-
ters should not compromise the security policy. However, the new
link changes the routing such that packets sent from AF to BD will
travel from R2 to R1 to R3 to BD—completely avoiding the packet
filter installed on interface i3.1 and violating the security policy.
When the designers eventually discover the security hole, probably
due to an attack exploiting the hole, they would typically respond
by copying the packet filter from i3.1 to i3.2, so it now also drops
packets from AF. This filter design does plug the security hole, but
it means that if the front office link from R2 to R4 fails, AF will be
unable to reach BF. Even though the links from R2 to R1 to R3 to
R4 are all working, the packet filter on interface i3.2 will drop the
packets from subnet AF.
In this example, the problems arise because the ability of a net-
work to carry packets depends on the routing protocols and the
packet filters working in concert. While routing automatically adapts
to topology changes, there is no corresponding way to automati-
cally adapt packet filters or other state. It could be argued that a
more “optimal” placement of packet filters, or the use of multi-
dimensional packet filters (i.e., filters that test both source and des-
tination address of a packet) would fix the problems shown in this
example. However, as networks grow in size and complexity from
the trivial example used here for illustrative purposes, finding these
optimal placements and maintaining the many multi-dimensional
packet filters they generate requires developing and integrating en-
tirely new sets of tools into the network’s management systems.
Since these tools will be separate from the protocols that control
routing in real time, they will perpetually be attempting to remain
synchronized with routing protocols by trying to model and guess
the protocols’ behavior.
In contrast, the 4D architecture simply and directly eliminates
this entire class of problems. The 4D architecture allows the direct
specification of a “reachability matrix” and automated mechanisms
for simultaneously setting the forwarding-table entries and packet
filters on the routers based on the current network state.
2.2 Peering Policies in Transit Networks
Routing policy is based on the premise that a router that does not








Figure 2: Autonomous Systems (ASes) peering with each other
via external BGP (eBGP) sessions. AS1 must place packet fil-
ters on its ingress links to prevent AS3 from sending packets to
destinations for which AS1 has not agreed to provide transit.
ets for that destination by that peer. However, the routing system
does nothing to prevent an unscrupulous peer from sending pack-
ets to that destination anyway. Enforcing routing policy is nearly
impossible with today’s control and management planes.
Figure 2 shows an example of three Autonomous Systems (ASes)
peering with each other via three external BGP sessions (one eBGP
session along each of the links shown in the figure). Assume that
AS1 is a major transit network, and it announces a route to desti-
nation d in its eBGP session with AS2. If AS1’s policy is to not
provide AS3 with transit service for d, it does not announce d in
its eBGP sessions with AS3. However, if AS3 wishes to be un-
scrupulous (e.g., use AS1 for transit service without paying), it can
assume AS1 does know a way to d (e.g., so AS1’s own customers
can reach d). If AS3 sends packets for d to br.nyc.as1, they will
definitely be delivered, as br.nyc.as1 must have a route to d in order
to handle legitimate traffic from AS2.
Enforcing routing policy requires installing packet filters to drop
packets to destinations which have not been announced as reach-
able. As the announcements received by an AS, and the AS’s own
topology, change over time, the announcements sent by the AS will
change and the packet filters must be moved correspondingly. Im-
plementing such functionality by adding another ad hoc script to
the management plane is essentially impossible today. Even if it
were possible to write a script that snoops on the eBGP announce-
ments sent to each neighboring border router and installs packet
filters on the ingress interface as appropriate, the script would be
extremely dangerous as it would not properly order the packet filter
installation/removal with the BGP announcements. For example, it
would be bad to announce to a neighbor border router a route to a
destination before removing the packet filters that drop the packets
sent to the destination.
Beyond ordering issues, transit networks handle a large num-
ber of destinations, and each packet filter applied to an interface
consumes forwarding resources and reduces the effective capacity
of the interface. It might be desirable to move packet filters into
the network whenever possible, away from the ingress interfaces,
so that one packet filter can enforce the BGP policy for multiple
ingress interfaces.
Enforcing routing policy requires dynamically placing packet fil-
ters to respond to the continually changing routes selected by that
policy. Correctly and optimally placing the filters requires that the
placement be synchronized with the announcement of routing deci-
sions and that the placement algorithms have access to the complete
routing topology of the network. The 4D architecture provides the
primitives and abstractions needed to implement correct placement
strategies and support placement optimization algorithms.
2.3 Same Problems, Many Guises
There are many data networks, designed and managed by differ-
ent organizations with different goals. Individual networks serve
radically different purposes; in addition to the familiar backbone
networks, there are access, metro, enterprise and data-center net-
works. In each of these settings, the network administrators strug-
gle to “program” their networks, integrating a diverse set of tech-
nologies and protocols, and artfully setting the configurable para-
meters that determine the network’s functionality and dynamics.
While the specific context, technology, and mechanisms may
change from network to network, there is commonality among the
problems. For example, while Ethernet was initially designed to
run on a shared medium, it has since evolved into a networking
technology with a full package of data plane, control plane, and
management plane to rival IP. Just as IP has many routing proto-
cols to compute the forwarding table, Ethernet has many variations
of the spanning tree protocol [3]. Just as IP networks have mecha-
nisms like MPLS to control the paths that packets take, Ethernet has
virtual LANs (and VLANs-in-VLANs). Just as IP networks have
needed to implement sophisticated functionality like traffic engi-
neering, security policies and fast restoration, these same needs are
being required of Ethernet in many contexts, such as enterprises,
data centers [4], and metro/access networks [5]. Just as ad hoc man-
agement capabilities need to be overlaid on top of the IP control
plane, achieving advanced functionality in Ethernet networks has
led to increasingly ad hoc and complex management systems. The
current architecture forces these systems to operate outside Ether-
net’s control plane, where they often come into conflict with it.
2.4 Moving Forward
We argue the key to solving the problems illustrated in this sec-
tion is creating a way for the architectural intent and operational
constraints governing the network to be expressed directly, and then
automatically enforced by setting data-plane states on the individ-
ual routers/switches. Until this occurs, we expect the design and
operation of robust networks to remain a difficult challenge, and
the state of the art to remain a losing battle against a trend where
ever richer and more complex state and logic are embedded in dis-
tributed protocols or exposed through box-level interfaces.
3. THE 4D ARCHITECTURE
Rather than exploring incremental extensions to today’s control
and management planes, we propose a clean-slate repartitioning
of functionality. We believe that a green-field approach based on
sound principles is necessary to avoid perpetuating the substantial
complexity in today’s design. We have developed the 4D architec-
ture as an extreme design point that completely separates the de-
cision logic from the underlying protocols. We deliberately chose
an extreme design as we believe that it crystallizes the issues, so
that exploring the strengths and weaknesses of this architecture
will lead to important network-level abstractions and a deeper un-
derstanding of the essential functionality needed in the underlying
routers and switches.
3.1 Design Principles
The rich literature on the complexity of today’s control and man-
agement planes has led us to the following three principles that we
believe are essential to dividing the responsibility for controlling
and managing a data network:
Network-level objectives: Each network should be configured
via specification of the requirements and goals for its performance.
Running a robust data network depends on satisfying objectives
for performance, reliability, and policy that can (and should) be
expressed separately from the network elements. For example, a
traffic-engineering objective could be stated as “keep all links be-
low 70% utilization, even under single-link failures.” A reachability
policy objective could be stated as “do not allow hosts in subnet B
to access the accounting servers in subnet A.” Today’s networks
require these goals to be expressed in low-level configuration com-
mands on the individual routers, increasing the likelihood that the
objectives are violated due to semantic mistakes in translating the
network-level objectives into specific protocols and mechanisms.
Network-wide views: Our notion of a network-wide view is
borrowed from the database community and means having assem-
bled a coherent snapshot of the state of each network component.
Timely, accurate, network-wide views of topology, traffic, and events
are crucial for running a robust network. The network-wide view
must accurately reflect the current state of the data plane, including
information about each device, including its name, resource limita-
tions, and physical attributes. However, today’s control plane was
not designed to provide these network-wide views, forcing sub-
stantial retro-fitting to obtain them. Instead of adding measurement
support to the system as an afterthought, we believe that provid-
ing the information necessary to construct a complete, consistent,
network-wide view should be one of the primary functions of the
routers and switches.
Direct control: Direct control means that the control and man-
agement system should have both the ability and the sole responsi-
bility for setting all the state in the data plane that directs packet for-
warding. The decision logic should not be hardwired in protocols
distributed among routers/switches. Rather, only the output of the
decision logic should be communicated to the network elements.
Satisfying network-level objectives is much easier with direct con-
trol over the configuration of the data plane. IP and Ethernet orig-
inally embedded the path-computation logic in simple distributed
protocols that incrementally grew more complicated, as discussed
earlier in Section 1. Because of the difficulty of extending the dis-
tributed control protocols to support sophisticated network-level
objectives such as traffic engineering or reachability control, the
management plane is typically used to implement these additional
capabilities. With only indirect influence over the network, today’s
management plane must replicate the state and logic of the control
plane and perform a complex “inversion” of the functionality. The
problem would be much easier to solve if the management plane
could compute the forwarding tables and install them in the rout-
ers. For direct control to be meaningful, it must be complete. If
configuration commands or multiple entities can affect the state in
the network elements, then yet more entities are required for audit-
ing (and correcting) the settings [6, 7, 8] to ensure the network-level
objectives are met.
In addition to these three principles, any design must also con-
sider traditional systems requirements, such as scalability, reliabil-
ity, and consistency. Our three principles attempt to capture the
issues specific to the control and management of networks. By
separating the network-specific issues from the traditional systems
requirements, we can apply existing techniques from other areas of
distributed computing research to the traditional systems problems
while exposing for closer scrutiny the network-specific ones.
3.2 New 4D Network Architecture
Although the three principles could be satisfied in many ways,
we have deliberately made the 4D architecture an extreme design
point where all control and management decisions are made in a
logically centralized fashion by servers that have complete control
over the network elements. The routers and switches only have










Figure 3: New 4D architecture with network-level objectives,
network-wide views, and direct control
instructions that control the behavior of the data plane, resulting in
network devices that are auto-configurable. Our architecture has
the following four components, as illustrated in Figure 3:
Decision plane: The decision plane makes all decisions driving
network control, including reachability, load balancing, access con-
trol, security, and interface configuration. Replacing today’s man-
agement plane, the decision plane operates in real time on a network-
wide view of the topology, the traffic, and the capabilities and re-
source limitations of the routers/switches. The decision plane uses
algorithms to turn network-level objectives (e.g., reachability ma-
trix, load-balancing goals, and survivability requirements) directly
into the packet-handling state that must be configured into the data
plane (e.g., forwarding table entries, packet filters, queuing para-
meters). The decision plane consists of multiple servers called de-
cision elements that connect directly to the network.
Dissemination plane: The dissemination plane provides a ro-
bust and efficient communication substrate that connects routers/-
switches with decision elements. While control information may
traverse the same set of physical links as the data packets, the dis-
semination paths are maintained separately from the data paths so
they can be operational without requiring configuration or success-
ful establishment of paths in the data plane. In contrast, in today’s
networks, control and management data are carried over the data
paths, which need to be established by routing protocols before
use. The dissemination plane moves management information cre-
ated by the decision plane to the data plane and state identified by
the discovery plane to the decision plane, but does not create state
itself.
Discovery plane: The discovery plane is responsible for discov-
ering the physical components in the network and creating logi-
cal identifiers to represent them. The discovery plane defines the
scope and persistence of the identifiers, and carries out the au-
tomatic discovery and management of the relationships between
them. This includes box-level discovery (e.g., what interfaces are
on this router? How many FIB entries can it hold?), neighbor dis-
covery (e.g., what other routers does this interface connect to?),
and discovery of lower-layer link characteristics (e.g., what is the
capacity of the interface?). The decision plane uses the information
learned from the discovery plane to construct network-wide views.
In contrast, in today’s IP networks, the only automatic mechanism
is neighbor discovery between two preconfigured and adjacent IP
interfaces; physical device discovery and associations between en-
tities are driven by configuration commands and external inventory
databases.
Data plane: The data plane handles individual packets based on
the state that is output by the decision plane. This state includes
the forwarding table, packet filters, link-scheduling weights, and
queue-management parameters, as well as tunnels and network ad-
dress translation mappings. The data plane may also have fine-
grain support for collecting measurements [9] on behalf of the dis-
covery plane.
The 4D architecture embodies our three principles. The decision-
plane logic operates on a network-wide view of the topology and
traffic, with the help of the discovery plane in collecting the mea-
surement data, to satisfy network-level objectives. The decision
plane has direct control over the operation of the data plane, obvi-
ating the need to model and invert the actions of the control plane.
Pulling much of the control state and logic out of the routers en-
ables both simpler protocols, which do not have to embed decision-
making logic, and more powerful decision algorithms for imple-
menting sophisticated goals.
3.3 Advantages of the 4D Architecture
Our 4D architecture offers several important advantages over to-
day’s division of functionality:
Separate networking logic from distributed systems issues:
The 4D architecture does not and cannot eliminate all distributed
protocols, as networks fundamentally involve routers/switches dis-
tributed in space. Rather, the 4D proposes separating the logic that
controls the network, such as route computation, from the proto-
cols that move information around the network. This separation
creates an architectural force opposing the box-centric nature of
protocol design and device configuration that causes so much com-
plexity today. The 4D tries to find the interfaces and functionality
we need to manage complexity—those that factor out issues that
are not unique to networking and enable the use of existing distrib-
uted systems techniques and protocols to solve those problems.
Higher robustness: By simplifying the state and logic for net-
work control, and ensuring the internal consistency of the state,
our architecture greatly reduces the fragility of the network. The
4D architecture raises the level of abstraction for managing the
network, allowing network administrators to focus on specifying
network-level objectives rather than configuring specific protocols
and mechanisms on individual routers and switches. Network-wide
views provide a conceptually-appealing way for people and sys-
tems to reason about the network without regard for complex pro-
tocol interactions among a group of routers/switches. Moving the
state and logic out of the network elements also facilitates the cre-
ation of new, more sophisticated algorithms for computing the data-
plane state that are easier to maintain and extend.
Better security: Security objectives are inherently network-level
goals. For example, the decision plane can secure the network
perimeter by installing packet filters on all border routers. Man-
aging network-level objectives, rather than the configuration of in-
dividual routers, reduces the likelihood of configuration mistakes
that can compromise security.
Accommodating heterogeneity: The same 4D architecture can
be applied to different networking environments but with customized
solutions. For example, in an ISP backbone with many optimiza-
tion criteria and high reliability requirements, the decision plane
may consist of several high-end servers deployed in geographi-
cally distributed locations. A data-center environment with Eth-
ernet switches may require only a few inexpensive PCs, and still
achieve far more sophisticated capabilities (e.g., traffic engineering
with resilience) than what spanning tree or static VLAN configura-
tion can provide today.
Enabling of innovation and network evolution: Separating the
network control from the routers/switches and protocols is a signif-
icant enabler for innovation and network evolution. The decision
plane can incorporate new algorithms and abstractions for comput-
ing the data-plane state to satisfy a variety of network-level objec-
tives, without requiring the change of either data packet formats or
control protocols (dissemination and discovery plane protocols in
the case of 4D). In addition, moving the control functionality out of
the router/switch software enables new players (e.g., the research
community and third-party software developers) to contribute to
the creation of these algorithms.
3.4 Challenges for the 4D Architecture
While the 4D holds the promise of the advantages above, and ini-
tial implementation efforts show these benefits can be achieved [10,
11, 12], there are clear risks its design must avoid:
Complexity apocalypse: A major drawback of today’s archi-
tecture is that it has enormous complexity distributed horizontally
across the network elements and vertically across many layers. The
4D architecture must achieve the same functionality as today’s sys-
tems, while also centralizing the decision logic and introducing new
capabilities, such as a network-wide reachability policies and zero
pre-configuration of routers/switches. Does the refactoring pro-
posed by the 4D architecture dramatically simplify the overall sys-
tem, or merely exchange one kind of complexity for another?
Stability failures: Since the network is distributed in space,
there are unavoidable delays in informing the decision elements
of events. For the global-scale enterprise and transit networks that
companies want to create, is it possible to create a network-wide
view stable and accurate enough for controlling such networks?
Scalability problems: The largest networks today have thou-
sands of routers/switches and tens of thousands of devices and the
default-free zone of today’s Internet handles routes hundreds of
thousands of destination prefixes. Is it possible for conventional
servers to manage so many devices and respond to events fast enough
to meet the network’s goals? Will the amount of management in-
formation being moved by the dissemination plane overwhelm the
network’s ability to carry data?
Response time: With the unavoidable speed-of-light delays and
the large quantity of control/management information to process,
is it possible to respond to network failures and restore data flow
within an acceptable period of time?
Security vulnerabilities: An attacker who compromises a deci-
sion element in a 4D network could control the entire network, sim-
ilar to the power afforded an adversary that breaks into the today’s
management plane or the routers themselves. The security of a 4D
system depends primarily on securing the dissemination plane that
forms the communication channels between the routers/switches
and the decision plane, and securing the decision plane itself. Is a
4D network more or less vulnerable to attack than routers running
distributed routing protocols?
3.5 Routing Control Platform
There has been substantial work on problems of controlling and
managing networks, and many different paradigms have been ex-
plored as outlined in Section 6 on related work. The Routing Con-
trol Platform (RCP) [11, 12] is especially consistent with our phi-
losophy and objectives, and serves to show how substantial change
in the management of IP networks is possible. RCP is a backwards
compatible system designed to give the operators of transit net-
works more control over how BGP routing decisions are made in
their Autonomous System (AS). We see RCP as an implementation
of a specific point that lies inside the design space of the 4D archi-
tecture, where RCP makes its design decisions to emphasize scala-
bility and deployability with conventional routers. For its decision
elements, RCP uses Routing Control Servers, which do not need a
coordination protocol because of the properties of the underlying
discovery plane. For a dissemination plane, RCP uses iBGP ses-
sions to tell the routers which BGP routes to use. For a discovery
plane, RCP snoops on the flooding of OSPF link-state advertise-
ments, and learns external BGP routes via the iBGP sessions with
the operational routers.
This paper and the 4D architecture focus on questions unad-
dressed by the work on the RCP. Rather than focusing on BGP
decision logic, we consider how a wide variety of network objec-
tives could be expressed to the control/management system, and
what new coordination protocols are required to achieve those ob-
jectives. RCP only considers BGP routes—a single part of the to-
tal state used by the data-plane to direct packets through the net-
work. This paper asks how to control all the data-plane forward-
ing mechanisms (e.g., FIB entries, packet filters, NATs, tunnels,
packet scheduling, and buffer management) in a coordinated fash-
ion to achieve the network’s objectives, and what protocols are
needed to achieve this coordination. RCP assumes routers are al-
ready correctly configured with significant amounts of state, such
as IP addresses and an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP). This pa-
per examines how zero pre-configuration of routers/switches can be
achieved and how a clean slate design of device identifiers and the
relationships among them can significantly simplify network con-
trol/management. Beyond considering only IP networks, this paper
also examines how a single management architecture could con-
trol different types of networks such as Ethernet (with or without
VLAN) IPv4, and IPv6 (with or without MPLS).
4. RESEARCH AGENDA
At this stage of our research, we do not yet know whether the
advantages of the 4D architecture will outweigh the challenges. In
the following sections, we will decompose these high-level ques-
tions into individual topics that constitute the research agenda that
we are pursuing.
We recognize our vision for the 4D architecture is broader than
what can be accomplished by us alone. By outlining the research
agenda for the 4D architecture, we hope to start a discussion inside
the larger research community on the clean slate design of network
control and management.
4.1 Decision Plane
In the 4D architecture, the decision plane is responsible for direct
control over the data plane based on a network-wide view, subject
to network-level objectives. Designing the algorithms for the de-
cision plane, and demonstrating their superiority over today’s con-
trol plane, is an essential part of the 4D research agenda; finding
effective ways to exploit the network structure and react in real
time to network events is especially challenging and important. To
avoid having a single point of failure, the decision-plane algorithms
should run on multiple servers spread throughout the network, lead-
ing to questions about whether, and how, to coordinate the actions
of the replicated decision elements (DEs). Ultimately, administra-
tive boundaries and scalability concerns lead to an architecture with
separate decision planes for different ASes or institutions. It is im-
portant to design protocols for DEs in one network to exchange
information with DEs in other networks.
4.1.1 Algorithms Satisfying Network-Level Objectives
The decision plane implements logic that converts network-wide
views and network-level objectives into directives for the data plane.
For example, the decision plane should, given a network topol-
ogy and traffic matrix, generate packet filters and forwarding-table
entries that satisfy traffic-engineering goals and reachability con-
straints. Ultimately, an ambitious goal is to create a language or
notation for expressing these network-level objectives. Below are
examples of research areas that lead to that goal.
Traffic engineering: Given a network topology and traffic ma-
trix, compute a forwarding graph—a forwarding-table entry for
each destination prefix at each router—that minimizes an objective
function, such as the maximum link utilization. This optimization
problem has been widely studied in the context of existing IP rout-
ing protocols, such as OSPF and BGP, where the output is a set
of OSPF weights and BGP policies that indirectly determine the
forwarding-table entries [13, 14]. An interesting research direction
is to explore whether the flexibility that results from having direct
control over the forwarding tables allows us to move beyond the
computationally intractable optimization problems that result from
today’s routing protocols [14].
Reachability policies: Given a network topology, a traffic ma-
trix, and a reachability matrix, compute a forwarding graph and
packet filters that minimize an objective function, while satisfying
the reachability constraints. In the simplest case, every edge link
could be configured with packet filters to impose the reachability
restrictions, with the forwarding-table entries permitting all pairs
of end-points to communicate. However, routers typically have re-
source limitations that restrict the number of packet filters on each
link, which substantially changes the nature of the problem.
Planned maintenance: Given a network topology, a traffic ma-
trix, and a planned event to disable certain equipment, compute a
sequence of changes to the forwarding graph to avoid using the
routers and links undergoing maintenance. (The same schedule of
forwarding-table changes could be applied, in reverse, to reintro-
duce the equipment into the network after the maintenance com-
pletes.) Each step should avoid introducing forwarding anomalies
(such as loops and blackholes) or link congestion. The goal is to al-
low maintenance to proceed without disrupting applications, such
as voice-over-IP (VoIP) and online gaming, that are sensitive to
transient packet losses during routing-protocol convergence.
In addition to these and other related algorithmic questions in
isolation, there are also several larger issues that arise in the design
of the decision plane:
Leveraging network structure: For each of these algorithmic
questions, there are scenarios where the decision plane can exploit
knowledge of the network structure. For example, the algorithms
for imposing reachability constraints would become simpler in an
access network with a tree-like structure. As another example, the
computational complexity of the algorithms could be reduced by
modeling a backbone network’s topology at a coarser level—where
each node is a Point-of-Presence (PoP) rather than a router. In each
case, the knowledge of the network structure could reduce the com-
putational overhead of the algorithms and facilitate better solutions.
Specification of network-level objectives: In addition to creat-
ing algorithms that solve specific optimization problems, we need
to design a decision plane that can satisfy multiple constraints and
optimize across multiple objectives simultaneously. An important
first step of this research is a deeper understanding of how to spec-
ify network-level objectives, including a configuration language for
the decision plane. The proposed configuration language should be
evaluated along two dimensions: complexity and expressiveness. It
should have a lower complexity than that of configuring individual
routers today. In addition, it should be able to express the network-
level objectives that arise in existing networks [2].
Finding the right separation of timescales: The decision plane
must react in real time to network events, such as equipment fail-
ures and routing-protocol messages from neighboring domains, with-
out invoking a complex optimization algorithm. Identifying the
right abstractions to support rapid reactions to unplanned events,
while still supporting optimization based on network-wide objec-
tives, is an important and challenging research problem. In de-
signing the decision plane, there is the opportunity to create new
algorithms that compute quick answers for the data plane, while of-
fering tunable parameters that can be optimized to satisfy network-
level goals. In contrast, today’s routing protocols (e.g., OSPF and
BGP) were not designed with optimization in mind, which leads to
computationally intractable optimization problems [14].
4.1.2 Coordination Between Decision Elements
Having a reliable decision plane is crucial to the robust operation
of the network. To avoid having a single point of failure, multiple
Decision Elements (DEs) should connect to the network at different
locations. Yet, the presence of multiple DEs should not compro-
mise the stable and consistent operation of the network. There are
several approaches for coordinating the decisions of the DEs, with
different underlying assumptions about the decision algorithms and
consistency requirements, including:
Distributed election algorithms: In one class of solutions, the
multiple DEs run a standard distributed-election algorithm, where
only the elected leader sends instructions to the data plane. This ap-
proach avoids scenarios where different DEs send inconsistent di-
rectives and obviates the need for the routers/switches to determine
which state to use. However, the election algorithm introduces ad-
ditional complexity and overhead, as well as delay for the network
to recover when the current leader fails.
Independent DEs: A second class of solutions allows the DEs
to operate independently, without any explicit coordination. Each
DE executes decision algorithms and contacts the network elements
based only on information provided by the dissemination plane. A
network element resolves commands from different DEs based on
static priorities and/or a timeout mechanism. This approach has
faster failover time and eliminates the need for the DEs to coordi-
nate, at the expense of more control traffic and the need for stronger
assumptions about the consistency of the information provided by
the dissemination plane. Initial studies in the context of BGP rout-
ing suggest that this approach is viable [12], though we need to
investigate how well (and whether) the approach applies to other
kinds of network state.
It is also possible to have hybrid schemes where each network
element receives instructions from a small subset of the DEs, using
priority and timeout mechanisms to resolve conflicts.
4.1.3 Introducing Hierarchy in the Decision Plane
In the simplest case, each DE has a complete view of the network
and makes decisions on behalf of each router. It is important to
enable hierarchical control of large networks over multiple (sets
of) decision elements. Consider the following two scenarios:
Large network managed by a single institution: Today, the
main techniques for scaling a large network include segmenting
the topology into multiple ASes, grouping nearby routers into a
single OSPF area, and aggregating destination prefixes at area and
AS boundaries. However, existing routing protocols lack the basic
abstractions common in hierarchical network designs, such as rout-
ing complexes (or central offices), Points-of-Presence (PoPs), and
geographic regions, and largely ignore the roles the routers play
in the network (e.g., access, hub, backbone, and peering). There
is a great opportunity for novel research that explores using these
design abstractions to support the management of hierarchical net-
works, including effective ways to divide responsibility across DEs
and to coordinate their actions.
Multiple networks managed by different institutions: Ulti-
mately, the decision plane for one network will need to communi-
cate with the decision planes in other institutions, such as customer,
peer, and provider ASes. If two neighboring ASes each have a de-
cision plane, their DEs can communicate directly to exchange in-
terdomain routing information, and perhaps to coordinate in other
ways (e.g., traffic engineering and network troubleshooting) [11,
15]. In this setting, neighboring ASes may be business competitors
that are reluctant to share information and are wary of cooperation.
4.2 Dissemination Plane
To establish the feasibility of the 4D architecture, we must design
a dissemination plane that provides robust communication paths
between decision elements and the routers/switches of the network.
Our vision for the dissemination plane is that it will expose an inter-
face that enables independent innovation of the decision elements
above and independent evolution of routers/switches below [16,
17]. As a first step towards a dissemination plane that can serve as
a universal kernel, we are designing a single dissemination plane
that can be used in both Ethernet and IP networks.
Connecting decision elements with routers/switches: It is im-
portant to create robust and efficient dissemination paths to carry
management information between routers/switches and decision el-
ements, without necessarily requiring successful establishment or
convergence of data plane paths. We propose to achieve this via
distinct protocols and forwarding tables for management informa-
tion. This approach has several advantages: (1) unlike data paths,
which must be optimized for a variety of objectives like traffic en-
gineering or security, dissemination paths can be optimized solely
for robustness of connectivity under failures; (2) management in-
formation can be communicated to and from routers before the data
channel is up or converges; (3) the dissemination paths are agnostic
to data plane technology or policies; and (4) management informa-
tion can be carried across data links as well as any extra physical
links created specifically for management robustness (e.g., modem
lines, or the supervisory channel on SONET and optical links).
There are at least three classes of solutions: flooding schemes,
spanning-tree protocols, and source routing. Flooding scales well
with the number of decision elements (by robustly multicasting
data from all routers/switches to all DEs), but scales poorly with the
number of router/switches. Spanning-tree protocols scale well with
both the number of decision elements and the number of router/-
switches, but exhibit poor reconvergence properties [18]. In source
routing schemes, beacons can assist in creating source routes from
each router/switch to the decision elements, or the decision ele-
ments can use their network-wide views to choose source routes
that load-balance dissemination data across the network.
Achieving direct control: Choosing the right transport and sess-
ion-layer semantics for the dissemination plane is critical for achiev-
ing our principle of direct control, and there is a broad design space
to explore. Packets carrying management information through the
dissemination plane may be lost, but retransmission of lost pack-
ets may not be the best policy. Instead, it might be better for the
decision elements to calculate new state updates for the remaining
routers/switches that can be reached without losses, where these
new state updates cause data packets to circumvent the network el-
ements that the decision plane can no longer reach.
Most state changes ordered by decision elements will involve up-
dating state on multiple routers/switches. There is a wide spectrum
of session layer semantics to explore, from the weak semantics of
“each router independently applies an update as soon as it is re-
ceived,” to network-wide commit semantics that apply all received
updates at a particular time, to full transactional distributed-commit
semantics. It is also possible to introduce various optimization
techniques, such as means of grouping related state updates into a
single session “transaction” and methods for allowing multiple de-
cision elements to send updates to overlapping sets of routers. An-
other interesting idea is to exploit good time synchronization (e.g.,
through NTP or a GPS receiver at each router or PoP) to instruct
the routers/switches to change from one configuration to another at
a specific time, resulting in infinitesimal convergence delay.
4.3 Discovery Plane
Controlling and managing a network requires creating a network-
wide view of all the devices that comprise the network, and the
physical and logical relationships between those devices. Today,
information about devices, their identities, and the relationships be-
tween them, is encoded in the static configuration files present on
the devices themselves and/or in management databases. For exam-
ple, router/switch interfaces are often configured with IP subnets,
and chaos ensues if cables are accidentally swapped such that inter-
faces with different subnets end up plugged together. Similarly, IP-
level interfaces connected by ATM or Frame Relay services must
be configured with the correct circuit ID used by the lower layer or
the interfaces will be unable to exchange packets. Maintaining con-
sistency between the inventory databases, configuration files, and
physical reality is a major headache and creates some of the thorni-
est problems faced in existing networks. These problems could
be eliminated by research to create a discovery plane that operates
from the ground up: automatically discovering the identities of de-
vices and components and the logical and physical relationships
between them. Some particularly interesting problems include the
following.
Support for decision-plane algorithms: An interesting research
direction is to design discovery services that support the decision-
plane algorithms described in Section 4.1.1, study the set of phys-
ical and logical entities and the corresponding set of relationships
that need to be managed, and explore how the persistence proper-
ties of the identities and relationships should be defined and en-
forced. As an example of the issues to be considered, a router
interface may be associated with a hardware port, a layer-2 logi-
cal port, an index for SNMP polling, an association with an optical
circuit, and more. With today’s architecture, most statistics, such
as utilization and interface failure rates, are retrieved and tracked
using the identity of the interface card. If the old card is moved to
another router and a new card installed in its place, the correct ad-
justment (to have the traffic statistics stay with the new card and the
history of interface failures move with the old card) is difficult to
realize in today’s systems. Yet, maintaining correct semantics dur-
ing low-level network change is extremely important to many high-
level network functions. For example, tracking transient failures is
important for predicting whether an interface card needs to be re-
placed, and an accurate history of traffic load between each pair of
routers is important for traffic engineering and capacity planning
(whether or not the specific cards have changed).
Bootstrapping with zero pre-configuration beyond a secure
key: In contrast to today’s networks, which require extensive con-
figuration before a router/switch can communicate, it is possible
to automatically bootstrap a 4D network assuming only that each
network element has a credential installed via a flashcard or USB
key. For example, upon booting, the router/switch will first auto-
matically generate an identity for itself and discover all its physical
components and attributes. Then, the router/switch will discover
its neighbors by exchanging identifiers and credentials with them.
The credentials help to establish the boundary of a network: two
adjacent routers/switches will continue with discovery only if they
have compatible credentials. Once neighbor discovery completes,
the router/switch can participate in the dissemination plane, allow-
ing it to send information about its physical components and at-
tributes (including the relationships between identifiers) to the de-
cision plane. Compared with today’s networks where identities and
relationships are established via a manual, open-loop configuration
process, within the 4D architecture the identities and relationships
are either discovered based on physical relationships or assigned
based on policies.
Supporting cross-layer auto-discovery: Two switches may not
be directly connected, but instead connected by a lower layer net-
work, such as a SONET network. There are two alternative ar-
chitectures to achieve cross-layer auto-discovery: peer-to-peer and
overlay. In the peer-to-peer architecture, directly connected devices
exchange discovery information, within and across network lay-
ers (e.g., routers at layer 3 and SONET ADMs at layer 1). In the
overlay architecture, discovery happens only between adjacent de-
vices at the same logical layer. A generic interface needs to be
defined between the two layers to allow the automatic establish-
ment of the associations between routers and switches. Two types
of lower layer networks, Ethernet and SONET, are good candidates
to explore these issues.
4.4 Data Plane
In the 4D architecture, the data plane handles data packets under
the direct control of the decision plane. This is in sharp contrast
to today’s architecture, where the responsibility for configuring the
data plane is split between the control plane (which combines in-
formation from different routing protocols to generate a forwarding
table) and the management plane (which configures access-control
lists, link-scheduling weights, and queue-management policies).
Although our framework is applicable to a wide variety of data-
plane technologies, we believe that the capabilities of the data plane
have a direct influence on the simplicity and flexibility of the logic
in the decision plane:
Packet-forwarding paradigms: Data networks employ a wide
variety of techniques for forwarding packets, ranging from the long-
est-prefix match paradigm (IPv4 and IPv6), exact-match forward-
ing (Ethernet), and label switching (MPLS, ATM, and Frame Re-
lay). A forwarding-table entry may direct traffic to a single out-
going link or multiple links, with either equal splitting of traffic or
more general support for weighted splitting. We plan to explore
how our decision-plane algorithms would vary depending on the
forwarding-paradigm supported in the data plane. For example, if
the data plane performs weighted splitting of traffic over multiple
outgoing links, the decision plane could apply multi-commodity
flow algorithms that assume that traffic is infinitely divisible. In
contrast, if each router directs all traffic for a destination to a sin-
gle outgoing link, the decision plane would be forced to construct
a sink tree for each destination prefix, requiring more complex al-
gorithms for optimizing the construction of the forwarding tables.
Studying these trade-offs will shed light on the tension between the
packet-forwarding capabilities of the data plane and the effective-
ness of the decision plane.
Advanced data-plane features: The data plane could incorpo-
rate new features that support the direct, network-wide control of
the decision plane. For example, the data plane could provide an in-
tegrated mechanism that combines packet forwarding, filtering, and
transformation (e.g., packet forwarding based on the five-tuple of
the source and destination addresses, port numbers, and protocol,
and efficient support for policy-based routing) to give the decision
plane direct control over reachability through a single mechanism.
To allay concerns over the response time of a 4D network, the data
plane could use preconfigured tunnels to support immediate local
reactions to unexpected network events, such as failures. For ex-
ample, the data plane could have a table that indicates how to adapt
packet forwarding after a particular link or path fails [19, 20] to
allow the data plane to react to network events before receiving
further instruction from the decision plane. Finally, the data plane
can assist in constructing an accurate, network-wide view of the
traffic by keeping fine-grain counters of the number of packets and
bytes that match in certain attributes [9] or providing configurable
support for packet sampling [21].
Throughout this part of our study, our goal is to understand how
enhancements to the data plane would help support the decision
plane, rather than to propose entirely new data-plane technologies.
5. EVALUATING NEW ARCHITECTURES
A major frustration for the research community has been the dif-
ficulty in conducting realistic network control and management ex-
periments to validate or experiment with alternate designs. Thank-
fully, this is now changing. There are multiple platforms on which
early research can be conducted and more opportunities than ever
before for deployment experience in production networks.
5.1 Experimental Platforms
For clean-slate designs that desire the maximum flexibility to
explore the space of network control and management, there are
now experimental platforms that allow the creation of complete
networks. For example, Emulab [22] allows experimenters to con-
struct a network using PCs with multiple Ethernet interfaces as
routers. The operating system on the PCs can be modified to im-
plement new packet forwarding paradigms, signaling protocols, or
control protocols. Large networks with almost arbitrary topologies
can be configured using the several hundred PCs available.
Several other experimental platforms even makes it possible to
specify and test the data plane. Jon Turner’s Open Network Lab
(ONL) [23] allows remote users to modify both the software run-
ning on the routers’ embedded processors and the actual packet
forwarding hardware, which is implemented using Field Program-
mable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Nick McKeown’s NetFPGA project [24]
similarly allows experimenters to modify both the router software
and hardware. NetFPGA also makes it easy to create networks that
mix physical router nodes with virtual nodes and to pipe Internet
traffic through a test network.
The GENI (Global Environment for Network Investigations) [25]
initiative at the U.S. National Science Foundation provides an ideal
environment for large-scale evaluation of the 4D architecture with
real user traffic. The GENI facility would provide an experimental
infrastructure with programmable network elements that can sup-
port new control and management architectures, while allowing
multiple researchers to evaluate different designs at the same time
in different “slices” of the infrastructure. As part of future work,
we hope to create a software infrastructure that would allow a wide
range of researchers to build and evaluate new designs for each of
the “planes” of the 4D architecture on GENI.
5.2 Opportunities for Field Deployment
Gaining field experience with new ideas for control and man-
agement requires both finding networks willing to deploy the new
ideas and adapting the ideas to those networks.
While there is a small and shrinking number of global transit
networks, municipal networks provide the potential for real de-
ployment experience in a carrier network—and their numbers are
growing rapidly. As of 2004 there were over 40 efforts by mu-
nicipalities and non-government organizations in the United States
to construct networks in their regions that connect some combina-
tion of businesses, public institutions, and residential users [26].
Often these networks aim to provide a triple-play of voice, video,
and data services, and so are an excellent challenge for any con-
trol/management architecture. As municipal activities, they are of-
ten open to collaborations with area universities and researchers.
Beyond the carrier network space, there is growing recognition
of the complexity of enterprise networks. Enterprise networks are
frequently called on to implement a wide variety of complex ser-
vices, but they are often run by operators who are not networking
experts, which increases the need for new ideas for controlling and
managing these networks. There are hundreds of thousands of en-
terprises of all different sizes and with many different requirements,
greatly expanding the number of potential deployment opportuni-
ties. We have found the IT departments of our own organizations
to be excellent places to begin our research.
Deploying new ideas for control and management into produc-
tion networks likely requires implementing those ideas using con-
ventional routers, which have closed software architectures and
speak only pre-existing protocols. However, there are many tech-
niques for overcoming this challenge and crafting hybrids that pair
current hardware/software with new ideas. For example, the Rout-
ing Control Platform (RCP) [11] work shows how a discovery plane
can be built by passive monitoring of the intradomain routing proto-
col (OSPF) [27, 28] and learning interdomain routes through inter-
nal BGP (iBGP) sessions with the conventional routers. Similarly,
dissemination can be implemented by using iBGP sessions to force
the desired routes into each router, or by using translator proxies to
convert the commands of the control/management system into the
configuration language of the routers.
6. RELATED WORK
The importance of network control and management in creat-
ing robust networks has been recognized by both the research and
network operator communities for many years. Many different par-
adigms for this area have been explored, including Signaling Sys-
tem 7 and the Intelligent Network, active networks, and policy-
based networking, and there is increasing attention in the Internet
research community [29]. This section explains the relationship
between the 4D architecture and some of the many existing efforts.
Traditional telecommunications networks: The concept of cen-
tralization is heavily used in many management paradigms for tele-
communication networks, usually based on circuit-switched tech-
nology [30]. In contrast, 4D focuses on packet-switching data net-
works that have more complex data-plane primitives (e.g., packet
forwarding based on longest-prefix matching, access control, NAT,
and tunnels) and higher network dynamics. Like Signaling System
7 (SS7) [31, 32], the 4D architecture keeps communication chan-
nels for management information isolated from the paths used by
user data. However, SS7 takes the approach of a hard separation
between management and user data onto separate links or chan-
nels, while the 4D architecture explores a softer logical separation
appropriate for links like Ethernet. The Intelligent Network (IN) ar-
chitecture [33] supports extension of network functionality by en-
abling user data (call placements) to trigger Detection Points that
invoke per-service code. Because the terminals in data networks are
fully-programmable devices, the 4D architecture deliberately does
not provide a way for a user-originated message carried by the data
plane to invoke functionality in the decision plane in order to avoid
a class of Denial of Service attacks to which the IN is vulnerable.
Active networks: The active networks community sought to
create networks with extensible functionality, and pursued several
approaches. Some, such as code-carrying packets, are quite differ-
ent from the 4D approach, but others, such as creating a minimal
kernel of functionality implemented on each router/switch to be in-
voked from another location [34], share the same goals as the 4D.
Management tools for a distributed control plane: Many tools
have been developed to ease the configuration of the existing ar-
chitecture for control and management, which depends on indi-
vidually configured switches/routers running a distributed control
plane. Some approaches, like those adopted by Cplane and Or-
chestream, developed frameworks to solve the problems inherent in
configuring large numbers of distributed switches/routers that may
use different command languages. Other tools focus on specific op-
erational tasks, such as traffic engineering or mitigation of Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attacks. For example, Cariden’s MATE [35] and
OpNet’s SP Guru [36] products can tune OSPF costs or MPLS La-
bel Switched Paths to the prevailing traffic, and ArborNetwork’s
PeakFlow DoS [37] product detects DoS attacks and generates fil-
ters to block the offending traffic. The general approach of Policy-
based networking (PBN) has been studied to automate provisioning
and network management in applications such as QoS [38].
While very useful for specific tasks, network-management tools
and PBN approaches usually assume the existing control-plane pro-
tocols, focus on a small portion of the configuration state (e.g.,
packet filters, but not routing), and do not consider the interactions
among multiple mechanisms. In contrast, in the 4D architecture the
network is directly controlled by decision elements using network-
wide views to manage all network state—it explicitly establishes
the decision plane as the place in the architecture for coordinating
all of the data-plane mechanisms and provides the decision plane
with the information it needs to operate.
Router configuration: A 2002 study estimates that half of net-
work outages stem from human configuration error [39]; similar
results have been found in studies of Internet services [40]. Analy-
sis focusing specifically on BGP routing suggests that configuration
errors are responsible for many network anomalies [41, 8]. Several
tools provide analysis across configuration files to reverse engineer
the router topology and summarize the status of the network [6, 7,
8, 42, 43]. However, despite their wide usage, these tools have not
eliminated configuration problems. In the 4D architecture, we elim-
inate the router/switch configuration files entirely and along with
them the need to verify their consistency or reverse engineer their
actions. Rather than retrofitting analysis tools on top of a shifting
pile of management tools, we propose an architectural change so
the network itself generates a view of its status and topology.
Separating forwarding and control: Driven by the desire to
separate router forwarding from protocols and network services,
significant prior work attempted to define an open router interface
analogous to OS interfaces at end-systems [44, 45, 46, 47]. Re-
cent standardization efforts within the IETF reflect this desire [48,
49]. Efforts in the OpenArch and OPENSIG communities suc-
ceeded in provisioning QoS in multi-service networks [50, 51, 52,
53]. Whereas these efforts attempt to modularize the architecture
and the functionality of individual routers, we propose to move the
logic (e.g., path computation) currently in the control plane out of
the routers and control plane altogether into a separate decision
plane equipped with network-wide views. Several recent propos-
als [11, 54, 55] argue for separating the computation of routes from
the individual routers. We also argue for placing the key function-
ality outside of the network but go further in two respects. First,
we believe that the architecture should explicitly provide a robust
dissemination means to directly control the data plane plane, rather
than driving the control plane by sending BGP or MPLS messages
to routers, as extensive configuration is required before the BGP or
MPLS messages can even be delivered. Second, we believe that the
management plane should dictate other aspects of network opera-
tions beyond routing (e.g., packet filtering and quality of service).
Discovery: Techniques for auto-discovery between neighbors
have been proposed in ATM with Integrated Local Management In-
terface (ILMI) [56] and optical networks with Generalized Multi-
Label Switching (GMPLS) [57] and Link Management Protocol
(LMP) [58]. ATM discovery assumes homogeneous link technol-
ogy (SONET), OSI control protocol stack, and requires NSAP ad-
dresses to be configured first. GMPLS discovery assumes IP con-
trol protocols at each switch controller and requires the protocols to
be configured first. In the 4D architecture, we aim to design discov-
ery service applicable to multiple network types that requires zero
pre-configuration. In addition, the discovery service will provide
interfaces to the decision plane to enable consistent and explicit
management of physical and logical identities, their scopes, their
persistence, and their relationships.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are fundamental questions to be answered in redesigning
control and management functions for data networks: How to go
from networks that blend decision logic with specific protocols and
mechanisms to an architecture that abstracts and isolates the deci-
sion logic and admits a range of efficient implementations? How
to go from networks that consist of numerous uncoordinated, error-
prone mechanisms, to ones where the low-level mechanisms are
driven in a consistent manner by network-level objectives? How to
go from networks where operators tune parameters, hoping to coax
the system to reach a desired state, to one where network design-
ers can directly express controls that automatically steer the system
toward the desired state? How to go from networks where human
operators leverage network-wide views and box-level capabilities
at slow timescales in decision-support systems, to one where the
network itself leverages this information in real time?
We believe there are huge opportunities for the research com-
munity to pursue a more revolutionary clean-slate approach to the
problem of network control and management. If successful, the
line of research could create an entire landscape of possibilities
for networking researchers to deploy their ideas on real networks.
Previously closed and proprietary control plane protocols will be
replaced by software running on conventional servers. New al-
gorithms and logic for network control can be developed and de-
ployed. Ultimately, data networks, equipped with new control and
management protocols and software, could be simpler, more robust,
more evolvable, and less prone to security breaches.
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